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We examine the costs of business group affiliation using data for 2,600 firms 
in nine East Asian economies for the 1994-1996 period.  We find that group-affiliated 
firms are on average valued below independent firms, with the discount attributable to 
firms whose ultimate owners have voting rights exceeding cash-flow rights. When 
there is no divergence between voting and cash flow rights, group-affiliated firms 
actually have a slight value premium over independent firms. Our results are robust to 
different valuation measures, time periods and estimation techniques.  The evidence is 
consistent with the view that the anticipation of expropriation associated with group 
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The Costs of Group Affiliation:  




Business group structures have long been associated with early stages of 
countries’ development as they can substitute for underdeveloped markets and 
institutions (Amsden, 1989; Aoki, 1990).  A group can be described as a corporate 
organization where a number of firms are linked through cross-ownership or where a 
single individual, family or coalition of families owns a number of different firms.  
Relative to independent firms, group structures are associated with greater use of 
internal factor markets, including financial markets. Capital-constrained firms may 
establish internal financial markets that allocate capital among firms within the group, 
which leads to economic benefits when external financing is scarce. At the same time, 
a diminished role of external markets in monitoring resource allocation and the more 
complex ownership structure of groups may prove conducive to greater expropriation. 
This has social costs, as some profitable investments are not undertaken while others 
(that are undertaken) require a higher rate of return.  The importance of these 
expropriation costs associated with corporate groups is the issue investigated in this 
paper.
2 
                                                            
2 The economic benefits of internal capital markets in allocating financial capital compared to 
external markets have been discussed in Williamson (1985) and Stein (1997).  On the other 
hand, a body of literature suggests that agency costs in diversified organizations could worsen 
allocation of resources and lead to inefficient investment (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Scharfstein 
and Stein, 1997; Scharfstein, 1998; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000).  In the context of 
groups, Lins and Servaes (1999a) report that the diversification performance of group-
affiliated firms in Japan is inferior to that of independent firms.  On the other hand, Khanna   2 
Group affiliation is a prevalent feature of publicly traded corporations in East 
Asia (Prowse, 1992; Backman, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000a), in 
contrast to the United States where publicly traded companies are typically 
independent. Corporations that belong to business groups are characterized by 
deviations of voting from cash flow rights that allow owners to gain effective control 
of their firms with low cash flow rights.  As argued in Stulz (1988) in the context of 
tender offers, and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1999b) in the 
context of expropriation, differences between cash flow rights and voting rights can 
affect corporate policies and firm value.  Large, controlling owners have incentives to 
expropriate minority shareholders by making investments that benefit themselves at 
the expense of minority shareholders. Firms with large controlling shareholders may 
also forego profitable investment opportunities. This is because their cost of capital is 
high, as investors anticipate the expropriation. Examples of expropriation are 
channeling corporate resources to projects that generate utility for the controlling 
owners but provide little benefits to the minority owners. 
The complicated ownership structures of groups—stock pyramids, cross 
shareholdings, and, to a lesser extent, dual-class shares—facilitate the creation of 
separation between the ultimate owners’ voting rights and cash-flow rights.  This 
provides ultimate owners the ability and the incentive to divert corporate resources for 
their private benefits at the expense of outside investors. Expropriation is more likely 
when voting rights are high and cash flow rights low, since the controlling owner 
gains in private benefits but bears little of the consequences of the reduction in the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and Palepu (2000) and Perotti and Gelfer (1999) provide evidence that groups and their internal 
factor markets are beneficial in emerging economies. However, they do not rule out the possibility 
of private appropriation of value.   3 
firm’s value (Bebchuk, 1999).  A recent literature actually argues that groups are 
being formed as a mean to capture private benefits. Wolfenzon (1999) models the 
rationale for forming groups.  He argues that the pyramidal structures of groups can 
be used by controlling owners to expropriate outside investors in countries with poor 
investor protection.  Group structures may also be used to prevent outsiders from 
taking over firms and sharing the private benefits (Nicodano, 1998, Bebchuk et al., 
1999). 
In this paper, we empirically examine the economic significance of 
expropriation in group-affiliated firms. As minority shareholders anticipate 
expropriation when firms are affiliated with groups, we expect that the value of 
group-affiliated firms be lowered by the relative amount of anticipated expropriation.   
To investigate this, we assemble a database containing group affiliation and ultimate 
ownership data for over 2,600 firms during the 1994-1996 period in nine East Asian 
economies.  Using these data, we document group affiliation of firms and the 
differences in ultimate ownership patterns between group-affiliated and independent 
firms.  We find that around 70 percent of firms are group-affiliated, and over 60 
percent of affiliated firms have ultimate owners with more voting rights than cash 
flow rights.  In contrast, divergence between cash flow and voting rights is almost 
non-existent among independent firms.   
We then compare the value of group-affiliated firms with that of independent 
firms and examine the extent to which expropriation can explain valuation differences. 
We find that group-affiliated firms in East Asia are associated with a four-percent 
value discount. To capture the incentives for expropriation, we use the degree of 
divergence between voting and cash flow rights of each firm’s largest ultimate owner.  
We find that the discount for group-affiliated firms arises from firms whose ultimate   4 
owners have more voting than cash-flow rights, and that the value discount disappears 
when there is no or only a small divergence.  These results control for a number of 
firm-specific factors affecting valuation and are robust to different valuation measures, 
time periods and estimation techniques. 
This paper contributes to the literature on the costs and benefits of groups by 
identifying expropriation as one important source of value loss of group-affiliated 
firms.  It suggests that legal reform in emerging and transition economies should 
focus on protecting minority investors, thus supporting other recent work (La Porta et 
al. 1999b; Berglof and von Thadden, 1999).  Our evidence can also be compared to 
studies that emphasize the economic benefits of internal markets associated with 
groups in emerging economies (Khanna and Palepu (1999) and Perotti and Gelfer 
(1999)). 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the sample and empirical 
measures.  Section 3 compares ownership and other characteristics between group-
affiliated and independent firms and examines the impact of separation of cash flow 
and voting rights on the value of affiliated firms relative to independent firms.   
Section 4 undertakes a number of robustness tests.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and measurement 
2.1. The sample 
We use data for 2,657 listed companies from nine Asian economies Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan 
and Thailand for the years 1994-1996. We start with 2,980 firms for which ultimate 
ownership data has been assembled by Claessens et al. (2000a).  The ownership data 
come primarily from Worldscope that reports block ownership (more than 5% stakes)   5 
and full financial information on companies.  It is supplemented with ownership data 
from the Asian Company Handbook, the Japan Company Handbook, the Annual 
Reports of the Hong Kong, Jakarta, Seoul, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila Stock 
Exchanges, as well as with data from the Korean Fair Trade Commission, the 
Securities Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook, and the Singapore Investment 
Guide. 
We drop 323 firms whose annual financial data are not reported by 
Worldscope in all years between 1994 and 1996.
3  We use this period as Worldscope 
covers substantially fewer companies before 1994.  The sample period ends in 1996 to 
avoid any effects of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis on our empirical results.  
We identify group affiliation status of the remaining 2,657 firms from country 
specific sources, as documented in Table 1.  The definition of group membership is 
country-specific, as there is no unified approach to define group affiliation.  In Korea, 
we use data provided by the Korean Fair Trade Commission, which defines group-
affiliated firms as those that are owned at least 30% by other firms in the same group. 
The definition of Indonesian and Thai business groups is based on whether the 
controlling family is the largest shareholder in the firm, irrespective of the actual level 
of holding.  In Taiwan, the definition of business groups is based on whether at least 
20% of the firm’s stock is owned by other firms in the respective group. 
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of our sample and compares some 
sample characteristics with all listed firms.  Our sample represents between 88 percent 
                                                            
3 Companies across the region report their annual results using different fiscal year-ends, but 
mostly March 31
st or December 31
st.  To facilitate comparison across the companies, we 
define the end of a year as March 31
st of the next year.  For example, 1996 is defined as 
beginning on April 1, 1996 and ending in March 31, 1997.     6 
(Singapore) to 24 percent (Taiwan) of listed firms, with an average of 46 percent for 
the nine economies. Of the 2,657 firms, 1,210 firms (45%) are from Japan. The 
average market equity value of the sample firms is $1,445 million, compared to $806 
million for all listed firms, i.e., there is a bias towards larger firms.  Firms from Japan 
($2,290 million) are the largest, followed by Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Korea, with Indonesia the smallest ($459 
million).  This ordering is the same as that of all listed companies, except for Thailand.   
On average, 68 percent of our sample firms are affiliated with groups.  Group-
affiliated firms dominate in Japan (79%), Indonesia (76%), and Philippines (72%), 
and represent 49% in Thailand, the lowest share.  To check the representativeness of 
our sample, we compare the degree of group-affiliation with that reported for five 
economies by Chan, Khanna, and Palepu (1999).   While they use different sources to 
classify firms, with the exception of the Philippines, their fractions of group-affiliated 
firms are very similar to ours.
4 
2.2. Ultimate ownership 
We identify for each firm its ultimate owners and their share of cash flow and 
voting rights, using data of Claessens et al. (2000a). The procedure of identifying 
ultimate owners is similar to the one used in La Porta et al. (1999a).  An ultimate 
owner is defined as the shareholder who is not controlled by anybody else (and who 
has at least 5 percent of the control rights of the company).  If a company does not 
have an ultimate owner, we classify it as widely held.  Although a company can have 
more than one ultimate owner, we focus on the largest ultimate owner, i.e., she who 
has the most voting rights.  We identify voting rights as well as cash flow rights of 
                                                            
4 The Philippine sample is the smallest in terms of number of firms. This could explain the 
difference.   7 
this ultimate owner.  The divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights can 
be large.  Suppose, for example, that a family owns 10% of the stock of a publicly 
traded Firm A, which in turn has 20% of the stock of a Firm B.  We define the family 
to control 10% of Firm B, the weakest link in the chain of voting rights. The family 
has, however, only 2% of the cash flow rights of Firm B, the product of the two 
ownership stakes along the chain. Using firm-specific information on pyramiding 
structures, cross-holdings, and deviations from one-share-one-vote rules, we 
determine the cash flow and voting rights for each firm. 
Our starting point is the Worldscope database, which generally provides the 
names and holdings of large owners.  We supplement this data with our information 
on business group affiliation. Information on dual-class shares is collected from 
Datastream.  We supplement the dual-class information with data from the Company 
Handbooks for Hong Kong, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.  In all cases, we 
collect the ownership structure as of December 1996 or the end of the 1996 
accounting year and use the 1996 ownership structures throughout our study. 
2.3. Valuation measure 
  We are interested in the valuation of firms that are affiliated with groups 
relative to that of independent firms.  Most research has employed Tobin’s q to 
analyze the discount in market values resulting from agency problems (Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Barclay and Holderness, 1989; McConnell and Servaes, 
1990). Tobin's q is constructed as the market value of assets divided by the 
replacement cost of assets.  For the purposes of the analysis, we define Tobin’s q as 
the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets, as 
replacement values are unavailable for all countries.     8 
To facilitate comparison across firms, we net out industry- and country-wide 
effects by subtracting from each Tobin's q the median Tobin's q of firms in the same 
primary industry sector in the same country, where industry sectors are defined at the 
level of two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes.  We have sufficient 
peer firms in our sample for most industry sectors in most countries. For a few 
industry sectors in some countries where we can identify less than three peer firms, 
we use broad industry groups as defined by Campbell (1996) to compute the industry 
median Tobin's q.    
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Characteristics of group-affiliated firms 
Table 3 reports the mean statistics for group-affiliated firms and independent 
firms.  We have 7,283 firm-years in the sample period, of which 5,061 for group-
affiliated firms and 2,222 for independent firms.  Because Japan comprises a large 
proportion of our sample, we report in a separate panel the statistics for the sample 
excluding Japan. 
In terms of ownership structure, the mean level of cash flow rights and voting 
rights for all firms is 0.15 and 0.18, respectively (excluding Japan, 0.22 and 0.26).  
The ultimate owners of affiliated firms have on average lower cash flow rights than 
those of independent firms: 0.12 versus 0.21 (0.21 and 0.24 if Japan is excluded). 
Average voting rights are 0.17 for affiliated firms and 0.21 for independent firms (if 
Japan is excluded, 0.27 and 0.24).  This suggests, with the exception of Japan, that 
ultimate owners of affiliated firms have typically more control rights than ultimate 
owners of independent firms. 
The key difference in ownership structures between group-affiliated firms and 
independent firms is the extent of divergence between ownership and control rights.    9 
To capture the divergence, we follow Claessens et al. (2000b) and compute the ratio 
of cash flow over voting rights, which ranges from zero to one.
5  We expect that a 
larger divergence is associated with greater incentives on the part of the ultimate 
owner to expropriate minority owners, implying that the ratio is inversely related to 
the incentive to expropriate.  The average ratio is 0.75 for all firms (0.86 excluding 
Japan), suggesting significant separation of ownership and control.  This is confirmed 
in the fraction of firms where voting rights exceed cash flow rights: 0.44 (0.35 
without Japan).  Deviations between cash flow and voting rights are closely 
associated with group affiliation: the average ratio is 0.64 for affiliated firms 
compared to 0.99 for independent firms (without Japan, 0.78 and 0.99), with the 
differences highly statistically significant. Comparing the fraction of firms where 
voting rights exceed cash flow rights, we find for affiliated firms a fraction of 0.63 
and for independent firms only 0.02 (without Japan, 0.57 and 0.03 respectively).   
These statistics indicate that divergence between cash flow and voting rights prevails 
among affiliated firms, and is almost not existent among independent firms.  The 
sharp difference arises, as independent firms do not have ownership structures 
involving stock pyramids and cross shareholdings, and there are only a few 
independent firms that have dual-class shares.  
We compare affiliated firms and independent firms on some other 
characteristics.  Affiliated firms are marginally more diversified than independent 
firms: measured at the 2-digit SIC code level, 59 percent of affiliated firms and 53 
                                                            
5 For a small number of firms, the cash-over-voting rights ratio is above one, as owners hold 
some stocks that have no voting rights.   10 
percent of independent firms have multiple business segments.
6  Similarly, on average 
affiliated firms have 2.39 business segments, while independent firms have only 2.25 
segments. Affiliated firms are also typically larger than independent firms are, with an 
average book value of assets of $7,128 million versus $3,556 million for independent 
firms (excluding Japan, $1,814 million versus $2,872 million, but this reversal is due 
to some extreme values).  Affiliated firms appear less profitable than independent 
firms do, with average operating income to sales ratio of 0.06 versus 0.09 (excluding 
Japan, 0.09 and 0.11).  In terms of sales growth, affiliated firms have significantly 
lower growth than independent firms do, 4 percent versus 8 percent.  This is largely 
attributable to Japanese firms, however. After excluding Japan, the difference 
becomes insignificant: 15 percent versus 14 percent. 
3.2. Valuation effects 
  Our main objective is to examine whether group affiliation affects the value of 
firms and what the role of separation of cash flow and voting rights is in explaining 
corporate valuation.  Table 4 provides the mean and median industry-adjusted Tobin’s 
q of affiliated and independent firms.
7  Measured by Tobin's q, the mean Tobin's q of 
                                                            
6 Company segment data were collected from Worldscope and supplemented with additional 
data from the Asian Company Handbook and the Japan Company Handbook. Since 
companies report their segment data at different levels of detail, we group the companies’ 
segments according to the two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) system.   
Following the previous literature, we classify firms as single-segment if at least 90 percent of 
their total sales are derived from one two-digit SIC segment.  Firms are classified as multi-
segment if they operate in more than one two-digit SIC industry and none of their two-digit 
SIC segments accounts for more than 90 percent of total firm sales. 
7 The sample size used in this analysis is 7,049 firm-years, smaller than the earlier sample, 
because of missing value in the computation of adjusted Tobin’s q and because we exclude   11 
affiliated firms is significantly smaller than those of the independent firms: 0.08 
versus 0.14, with the medians 0.00 versus 0.005 (excluding Japan results are similar, 
mean (median) adjusted Tobin’s q of 0.10 (0.00) versus 0.15 (0.005)). 
To investigate the role of separation of ownership and control, we classify 
affiliated firms into two sub-samples, depending on whether there is divergence or not. 
When there is no divergence between cash flow and voting rights, i.e., C/V=1, there is 
no statistically significant difference in Tobin's q between affiliated and independent 
firms.  In contrast, when divergence exists, i.e., C/V<1, affiliated firms’ values are 
statistically significant lower than that of independent firms, with an average Tobin's 
q of 0.05 for affiliated firms and 0.14 for independent firms (excluding Japan, a 
similar result holds).  Comparing medians yields the same result.  This comparison 
suggests that valuation differences between affiliated and independent firms are 
closely related to the divergence between cash-flow and voting rights, not to group 
affiliation per se. 
3.3. Regression analysis 
  We perform a multiple regression analysis to test if our results in Table 4 hold 
after controlling for other factors that may affect value.  The dependent variable is the 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s q. To capture the valuation effects associated with group 
affiliation, we include a group dummy variable (GROUP), equal to one if the firm is 
affiliated with a group, and otherwise zero.  We include three control variables.   
Several studies have provided evidence that diversification is detrimental to firm 
value (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Claessens et al., 1999 for East Asia; Lins and Servaes, 
1999b for emerging markets).  As affiliated firms are more diversified than 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the top- and bottom-one percent of observations ranked by the adjusted Tobin’s q to mitigate 
any effects of outliers.   12 
independent firms are, value differences could thus be explained by differences in 
degree of diversification.  We therefore include a segment dummy variable (SEG) 
equal to one if the firm has more than one segment, and zero otherwise.   
Prior studies have shown that growth prospect affect value (Lang and Stulz, 
1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995).  As affiliated firms have on average lower growth rate 
than independent firms, we control for growth opportunities.  Following La Porta et al. 
1999b, we include sales growth (GSALES), measured by the growth rate of sales 
from the previous fiscal year-end to the current fiscal year-end.
8   U.S. evidence 
furthermore suggests that the relation between firm size and q is negative (Lang and 
Stulz, 1994).  It is possible that this influences the group-affiliation effect as well as 
affiliated firms are on average larger than independent firms are. We therefore include 
firm size (Log(ASSETS)), measured as the natural logarithm of book assets in 
thousands of U.S. dollar.  We also include 1995 and 1996 dummy variables to control 
for fixed effects. 
We employ ordinary least squares regression analysis and use the pooled 
sample (5,813 firm-years) as well as the sub-sample that excludes Japan firms (2,425 
firm-years).  The sample size is reduced from the earlier size due to some missing 
values for the control variables.  Regression results are reported in Table 5.  Based on 
the pooled sample, the estimated coefficient of GROUP is a negative 3.66 percent, 
                                                            
8 Other studies have used R&D expenditures and capital expenditures. R&D expenditures are 
missing for most of the firms in our sample. Data availability of capital expenditures is poor 
for Japan but reasonably good for the other economies.  To test if our results are sensitive to 
the use of proxy for growth prospect, we perform regressions on a smaller sample using 
capital expenditure over sales instead of sales growth.  The results (not reported) are 
qualitatively similar.   13 
which is statistically significant at the one-percent level (Equation (1)), and consistent 
with the results reported in Table 4.  After excluding Japan, the estimated coefficient 
is of the same magnitude, but statistically insignificant (Equation (2)).  This evidence 
suggests that group affiliation is associated with a value loss of about four percentage 
points.  The estimated coefficients of the control variables are mostly of the expected 
signs.  Value is negatively related to diversification (SEG), firm size (Log(ASSETS)), 
while positively related to sales growth (GSALES).  
We next account for the effect of separation of ownership and control among 
group-affiliated firms.  We modify the regression model by including an additional 
explanatory variable: GROUP*C/V, which captures the effects of anticipated 
expropriation induced by the divergence between cash flow and voting rights of 
ultimate owners for group-affiliated firms.  The results are reported in Equations (3) 
and (4) of Table 5.  Using the pooled sample, the estimated coefficient of GROUP is a 
negative 12.91 percent, which is highly significant (t-statistic –7.20). And, the 
estimated coefficient of GROUP*C/V is a positive 14.93 percent and is also highly 
significant (t-statistic 7.63).  Without Japan, these two coefficients are –23.10 percent 
and 25.13 percent respectively and again highly statistically significant. The estimated 
coefficients of the control variables remain of the expected signs and magnitudes. 
The positive coefficient of GROUP*C/V indicates that affiliated firms’ value 
are lower when the divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights is large.  In 
the extreme case when C/V is close to zero, the value loss associated with group-
affiliation is 12.91 percent (23.10 percent if Japan is excluded).  Without divergence 
(C/V=1), the sum of the two coefficients (GROUP and GROUP*C/V) suggests that 
affiliated firms have a value premium of about 2 percentage points over independent 
firms (this also holds excluding Japan).  This suggests that the value loss reported for   14 
group-affiliated firms is largely due to group-affiliated firms whose ultimate owners 
possess more voting rights than cash flow rights, i.e., where C/V<1.  The evidence is 
consistent with the view that the anticipation of expropriation is an important negative 
factor for firms affiliated with groups. Dividing the sample of group-affiliated firms 
into those with ultimate owners with large control stakes and those with smaller 
stakes, we find that the value loss is the greatest for the sub-sample of firms 
characterized by both cash-vote divergence and high control level (not reported). The 
fact that results are even stronger in this sub-sample yields further credence to the 
expropriation view. 
 
4. Robustness  tests 
So far, we have used the industry adjusted Tobin's q.  We do not expect any 
bias from this method, but as a robustness check, we also use the unadjusted Tobin's q 
in our regressions, i.e., the market to book value of the firm, unadjusted for the effects 
of the industry the firm is primarily in.  Table 6 reports the results, where we also use 
a fixed-effects estimator (using dummies for industry, country, and year).  We find 
very similar results to those reported in Table 5.  The coefficient for GROUP is a 
negative 2 percent, but not statistically significant.  When including the divergence 
variables, we find that the coefficient for GROUP is a negative –0.1235, and again 
highly statistically significant, and the coefficient for GROUP*C/V a positive 0.1551, 
also highly statistically significant.  Without Japan, the results are again similar, -
0.2093 for GROUP and 0.2401 for GROUP*C/V.   The coefficients for the firm-
specific control variables retain their sign and significance.  The results thus confirm 
the importance of anticipated expropriation in explaining the valuation discount for 
group-affiliated firms.    15 
As a further robustness check, we use a sales-weighted valuation measure. As 
noted, many East Asian firms have significant operations in multiple segments, i.e., 
they are conglomerate firms.  To examine whether this influences the results when 
using (adjusted) Tobin's q, we use instead an excess value measure similar to Berger 
and Ofek (1995).  The excess value, EXV, is defined as the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of the firm’s actual value to its imputed value.
9    
Table 7 reports the set of empirical analysis based on this excess value 
measure.  The results are qualitatively similar to the results based on industry-adjusted 
Tobin’q. The coefficient for GROUP is -0.06 and statistically significant.  When 
including the ownership divergence variables, we find that the coefficient for GROUP 
is –0.2507 and again highly statistically significant, and the coefficient for 
GROUP*C/V a positive 0.3020, also highly statistically significant.  Without Japan, 
the results are again similar, -0.3722 for GROUP and 0.4122 for GROUP*C/V.   For 
this estimation, the value of group-affiliated firms with the most divergence, i.e., C/V 
= 0, would be 25 percentage point lower compared to independent firms.  In contrast, 
for group-affiliated firms with no divergence, i.e., C/V=1, valuation would be about 5 
percentage points higher than that of independent firms. 
                                                            
9 Market capitalization, the market value of common equity plus the book value of debt, is 
used as the measure of actual firm value. The imputed value is calculated as follows. We first 
compute median market-to-sales ratio for each two-digit SIC industry in each country using 
only single-segment firms.  The market-to-sales ratio is the market capitalization divided by 
firm sales.  We then multiply the level of sales in each segment of a firm by its corresponding 
industry median market-to-sales ratio.  The imputed value of the firm is obtained by summing 
the multiples across all segments.     16 
  Lastly, we also run tests for sub-samples by year and using a random effects 
estimator. Table 8 reports the results, using the specification of equation of Table 5, 
for each of the three years.  All results are similar to those of Table 5, and coefficients 
barely change compared to using the whole sample. The slope coefficients for 
GROUP, for example, vary from 0.1167 to 0.1464 and the slope coefficients for 
GROUP*C/V from 0.1458 to 0.1564, thus bordering the coefficients of the 
specification of Table 5.   
Using different estimation techniques does not alter the results either.  Table 9 
provides the results from the random effects estimation, again using the specification 
of Table 5.  The results are qualitative and quantitative the same as those of Table 5, 
as well as results from other specifications. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We provide strong empirical support that an important source of value loss of 
group-affiliation arises from the anticipation of expropriation of minority shareholders 
by controlling owners.  Group-affiliation is associated with more concentration of 
control in the hands of few ultimate owners and often large divergence of control 
from cash flow rights.  These ownership structures imply that the ultimate owners of 
corporate groups have the ability and incentive to expropriate minority shareholders.  
Given the risk of expropriation, it comes as no surprise that minority shareholders 
discount the value of the group-affiliated firms.  We find that the larger the 
divergence between ownership and control, the larger the value loss. Once we control 
for the effects of ownership structure, group affiliation does not diminish firm value, 
and may actually enhance value slightly.   17 
Our findings are generally consistent with the predictions of several recent 
theoretical models on the causes and consequences of separation of ownership and 
control (Bebchuk et al. 1999, Bebchuk, 1999, La Porta et al., 1999b) as well as the 
formation of groups (Wolfenzon, 1999).  They also extend the previous body of 
evidence that expropriation is an important agency problem around the world.   
Although we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that expropriation 
hurts the value of group-affiliated firms, we have not investigated directly whether 
groups provide any economic gains. These gains could result from more efficient 
allocation of resources in internal markets and better risk sharing relative to external 
financial markets.  Future research into the specific relations between group affiliation, 
internal markets and expropriation would help us understand better the reasons for 
different organizational structure of firms, and their effects on corporate value.   18 
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Table 1:  Sources of Group Affiliation Data for East Asian Firms 
    
 
    
Country Source  Definition 
    
Hong Kong  Chu, Yin-Wah and Gary Hamilton, 1993, Business Networks in Hong 
Kong, University of California, Davis, mimeo. 
 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 1992, Have Cash, Will Travel, March 
5, Special Section on the Li ka-Shing Conglomerate 
 
Hong Kong Company Handbook, 1998  
 
The family is the 
largest shareholder of 
the firm 
Indonesia  Fisman, Ray, 1998, Announcement Effects of Suharto’s Illnesses on 
Related Companies, Working paper, Harvard Business School.  
 
W.I.Carr Banque Indosuez Group, 1997, Indonesian Group 
Connections, Jakarta, Indonesia 
 
Indobusiness, 1998, 1995 Ranking of Indonesian Largest 
Conglomerates, available at 
http://indobiz.com/company/warta/conglo/htm 
 
The family is the 
largest shareholder of 
the firm 
Japan  Dodwell Marketing Consultants, 1997, Industrial Groupings in Japan: 
the Anatomy of the “Keiretsu,” 12
th Edition, 1996/1997, Tokyo, Japan. 
 
Sato, Kazuo, 1984, “The Anatomy of Japanese Businesses,” 
M.E.Sharpe, Chapter 4. 
 
The company’s CEO 
sits in the group’s 
President’s breakfast. 
Korea (South)  Korean Fair Trade Commission, 1997, 1996 List of Largest 30 
Chaebol, Seoul, Korea. 
 
Lim, Ungki, 1998, Ownership Structure and Family Control in Korean 
Conglomerates: with Cases of the 30 Largest Chaebol, Seoul 
University, Korea. 
 
At least 30 percent of 
the stock of the firm is 
owned by other firms 
in the group. 
Malaysia  Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 1997, Malaysian Company Handbook 
 
Hiscock, Geoff, 1998, Asia’s Wealth Club, Nicholas Brealey. 
 
The family is the 
largest owner. 
Philippines  Philippine Stock Exchange, 1997,  Investment Guide 1996, Manila. 
 
Tan, Edita, 1993, Interlocking Directorates, Commercial Banks, Other 
Financial Institutions, and Non-Bank Corporations, Philippine Review 
of Economics and Business, 30, 1-50.  
 
A family member sits 
on the Management 
Board and/or the 
Board of Directors. 
Singapore  Singapore Stock Exchange, 1997, Singapore Company Handbook. 
 




The family is the 
largest owner.   22 
 
 







Taiwan  China Credit Information Service, 1997, Business Groups in Taiwan, 
1996-1997, Taipei, Republic of China. 
 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 1994, The Money Machine, August 11, 
for the corporate holdings of the Kuomintang. 
The firm is counted as 
group-affiliated if 
other firms in the 
group own 20 percent 
of the stock. 
Thailand  Tara Siam Ltd., 1997, Thai Business Groups 1996/1997: A Unique 
Guide to Who Owns What, Bangkok, Thailand. 
 
The Nation, 1998, Thai Tycoons: Winners and Losers in the Economic 
Crisis, July, Special Issue. 
 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 1997, From Chickens to Microchips: 
the Story of Thai Conglomerates, January 23. 
The firm is listed as a 
related company in 
the annual report of 
the leading company 
in the group. 
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Table 2: Sample Characteristics 
        
The sample includes 2657 firms whose ownership data are available from the dataset assembled by Claessens et al. (2000a) and whose financial data are available from 
Worldscope in at least one year during the 1994-1996 fiscal years.  Group affiliation data of the sample firms are from country-specific sources as reported in Table 1. 
The market equity value of the sample firms are calculated at their 1996 fiscal year end dates or, if the 1996 data not available from Worldscope, the most recent fiscal 
year end dates prior to 1996.  The IFC Emerging Stock Market Factbook as of December 31, 1996 reports the number and market equity value of listed companies in the 
nine economies.   
Country 
Number of firms in 
the sample 
Number of listed 
firms in the 
economy 
Sample firms in 
fraction of all listed 
firms  
Average equity 
value of the sample 
firms ($ millions) 
Average equity 
value of all listed 
firms in ($ millions) 




Fraction of listed 
firms affiliated with 
groups as reported 
by Chang, Khanna, 
and Palepu (1999) 
         
Hong  Kong  312 561 0.56 827 801 0.56  - 
Indonesia  146 253 0.58 459 360 0.76  0.61 
Japan  1210 2334 0.52 2290 1323 0.79  - 
Korea  (South)  271 760 0.36 563 183 0.53  0.53 
Malaysia  197 621 0.32 695 495 0.58  - 
Philippines 97  216  0.45  628  373  0.72  0.36 
Singapore  196 223 0.88 774 674 0.64  - 
Taiwan  92  382 0.24 1364 716 0.55 0.41 
Thailand  136 454 0.30 725 220 0.49  0.57 
         
All 2657  5804  0.46  1445  806  0.68  - 
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Table 3:  Comparison of mean characteristics between  
group-affiliated and independent firms in East Asia 
 
The sample includes 7283 firm-years from 1994 to 1996, of which 5061 are affiliated firms and 2222 are independent 
firms.  Due to missing value, smaller numbers of observations are used to compute the mean statistics for the segment, 
operating income over sales, and sales growth variables.   
 
 





      
Panel A: All countries 
Cash-flow  rights  0.15 0.12 0.21  -28.39 
Voting  rights  0.18 0.17 0.21  -13.30 
Cash flow rights over voting rights  0.75  0.64  0.99  -71.52 
Fraction of firms with cash-vote divergence  0.44  0.63  0.02  83.32 
Number  of  segments  2.35 2.39 2.25 3.42 
Fraction of firms with multiple segments  0.58  0.59  0.53  4.21 
Total assets (MM$US)  6038  7128  3556  5.64 
Operating income over sales  0.07  0.06  0.09  -3.36 
Sales  growth  0.05 0.04 0.08 -4.47 
      
Panel B: East Asia excluding Japan 
Cash flow rights  0.22  0.21  0.24  -7.96 
Voting  rights  0.26 0.27 0.24 6.18 
Cash flow rights over voting rights  0.86  0.78  0.99  -39.51 
Fraction of firms with cash-vote divergence  0.35  0.57  0.03  48.43 
Number  of  segments  2.33 2.42 2.19 3.84 
Fraction of firms with multiple segments  0.55  0.57  0.50  3.36 
Total assets (MM$US)  2241  1814  2872  -2.26 
Operating income over sales  0.11  0.09  0.11  -1.08 
Sales  growth  0.15 0.15 0.14 0.95 
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Table 4:  Value differences between group-affiliated and independent  
firms in East Asia 
 
 
Value is measured by industry median-adjusted Tobin's q.  Tobin's q is defined as market value of equity 
plus book value of debt divided by total assets.  Subtracting the median q of the firm’s primary industry 
sector from its own q makes the industry adjustment.  The median q is computed from all firms in the same 
country and primary industry sector.  Industry sector is defined at the two-digit SIC code level.  In a small 
number of cases when less than three peer firms are identified within a two-digit SIC code industry, broad 
industry groups as Campbell (1996) are used.  To minimize the effects of outliers, the sample excludes one-
percent extreme value.  The resulting sample includes 7049 observations of firms from 1994 through 1996. 
C/V is the ratio of cash flow to voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of a firm.  *** denotes 
statistical significance at the one-percent level. 
   Group-affiliated  firms 
 Independent firms  All   C/V=1  C/V<1 
      
Panel A: All countries 
Mean  0.14 0.08 0.12 0.05 
T-statistic for difference    -5.12***  1.41  -6.85*** 
Median  0.005  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Z-statistic for difference    -3.57***  0.66  -4.78*** 
Number  of  observations  2125 4924 1816 3108 
      
Panel B: East Asia excluding Japan 
Mean  0.15 0.10 0.14 0.07 
T-statistic for difference    -2.63***  0.41  -3.84*** 
Median  0.005  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Z-statistic for difference    -3.06***  1.57  -3.41*** 
Number of observations  1433  2132  904  1228 
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Table 5:  Regression analysis of the impact of group affiliation and cash-vote 
divergence on corporate value in East Asia 
 
The regressions employ the ordinary least squares method.  The dependent variable is industry adjusted Tobin's 
q.  On the right-hand side, GROUP is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is affiliated with a corporate 
group, and otherwise zero.  SEG is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has more than one segment, and 
otherwise zero.  C/V is the ratio of cash flow to voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the 
firm.  GSALES is sales growth.  The regressions also control for fixed-year effects (not reported).  The full 
sample includes 5,826 firm-years from nine East Asian economies during 1994 through 1996.  *** and ** 
denote statistical significance at the one-percent and five-percent level, respectively. 
Independent  variable  Pooled Excluding  Japan Pooled Excluding  Japan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Intercept 0.6148*** 1.0958*** 0.6232*** 1.1212*** 
  (13.15) (11.76) (13.39) (12.05) 
      
GROUP -0.0357*** -0.0350 -0.1291*** -0.2310*** 
  (-2.71) (-1.54) (-7.20) (-4.48) 
      
GROUP*C/V     0.1493*** 0.2513*** 
     (7.63)  (4.23) 
      
SEG -0.0387*** -0.0360 -0.0363*** -0.0352 
  (-3.28) (-1.61) (-3.10) (-1.58) 
      
GSALES 0.0672*** 0.0764*** 0.0516** 0.0752*** 
  (3.29) (2.63) (2.53) (2.59) 
      
Log(ASSETS) -0.0341*** -0.0704*** -0.0346*** -0.0724*** 
  (-10.50) (-10.32) (-10.70) (-10.62) 
      
Adjusted R
2  0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Observations 5826 2438 5826 2438 
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Table 6:  Regression analysis of the impact of group affiliation and cash-vote 
divergence on Tobin's q in East Asia 
 
 
The regressions employ the ordinary least squares method.  The dependent variable is Tobin's q.  On the right-
hand side, GROUP is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is affiliated with a corporate group, and 
otherwise zero.  SEG is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has more than one segment, and otherwise 
zero.  C/V is the ratio of cash flow to voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm. 
GSALES is sales growth.  The regressions also control for fixed-industry, fixed-country, and fixed-year 
effects (not reported).  The full sample includes 5,826 firm-years from nine East Asian economies during 
1994 through  1996.  *** and ** denote statistical significance at the one-percent and five-percent level, 
respectively. 
Independent  variable  Pooled Excluding  Japan Pooled Excluding  Japan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Intercept 1.8070*** 2.2826*** 1.8503*** 2.3051*** 
  (27.70) (18.80) (28.38) (19.02) 
      
GROUP -0.0210  -0.0211  -0.1235*** -0.2093*** 
  (-1.52) (-0.89) (-6.32) (-3.84) 
      
GROUP*C/V     0.1551*** 0.2401*** 
     (7.40)  (3.83) 
      
SEG  -0.0017 -0.0256 -0.0028 -0.0275 
  (-0.13) (-1.04) (-0.21) (-1.12) 
      
GSALES 0.0728*** 0.0738** 0.0730*** 0.0735** 
  (3.29) (2.47) (3.31) (2.47) 
      
Log(ASSETS) -0.0578*** -0.0867*** -0.0601*** -0.0888*** 
  (-14.49) (-10.57) (-15.09) (-10.83) 
      
Adjusted R
2  0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 
Observations 5826 2438 5826 2438 
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Table 7:  Regression analysis of the impact of group affiliation and cash-vote divergence 
on excess value in East Asia 
 
The regressions employ the ordinary least squares method.  The dependent variable is excess value defined as the 
natural logarithm of actual to imputed value (Berger and Ofek, 1995).  On the right-hand side, GROUP is a 
dummy variable equal to one if a firm is affiliated with a corporate group, and otherwise zero.  SEG is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm has more than one segment, and otherwise zero.  C/V is the ratio of cash flow to 
voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  GSALES is sales growth.  The regressions also 
control for fixed-year effects (not reported).  Observations with extreme excess value (excess value > 4 or <0.2) 
are excluded.  The resulting sample includes 5,616 firm-years from nine East Asian economies during 1994 
through 1996.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the one-percent five-percent, and ten-percent level, 
respectively. 
Independent  variable  Pooled Excluding  Japan Pooled Excluding  Japan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Intercept -0.3406*** -0.1905** -0.3203*** -0.1479 
  (-5.94) (-1.91) (-5.66) (-1.49) 
      
GROUP -0.0611*** -0.0488** -0.2507*** -0.3722*** 
  (-3.80)  (-2.02) (-11.57) (-6.60) 
      
GROUP*C/V     0.3020*** 0.4122*** 
     (12.84)  (6.34) 
      
SEG  -0.0252*  -0.0232 -0.0211 -0.0216 
  (-1.76) (-0.97) (-1.49) (-0.91) 
      
GSALES  -0.0008 -0.0388 -0.0458 -0.0418 
  (-0.02) (-1.00) (-1.58) (-1.09) 
      
Log(ASSETS) 0.0294*** 0.0205*** 0.0284*** 0.0173** 
  (7.44) (2.82) (7.29) (2.39) 
      
Adjusted R
2  0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 
Observations  5616 2281 5616 2281 
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Table 8:  Year by year regressions of the impact of group affiliation 
and cash-vote divergence on corporate value in East Asia 
 
 
The regressions employ the ordinary least squares method.  The dependent variable is 
industry adjusted Tobin's q.  On the right-hand side, GROUP is a dummy variable 
equal to one if a firm is affiliated with a corporate group, and otherwise zero.  SEG is 
a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has more than one segment, and otherwise 
zero.  C/V is the ratio of cash flow to voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate 
owner of the firm.  GSALES is sales growth.  The regressions also control for fixed-
year effects (not reported).  The full sample includes 5,826 firm-years from nine East 
Asian economies during 1994 through  1996.  *** and ** denote statistical 
significance at the one-percent and five-percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Independent variable  1994  1995  1996 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
Intercept 0.6979*** 0.5725*** 0.5712*** 
 (8.88)  (7.16)  (7.51) 
      
GROUP -0.1167*** -0.1222*** -0.1464*** 
 (-3.72)  (-3.90)  (-4.81) 
      
GROUP*C/V 0.1564*** 0.1493*** 0.1458*** 
 (4.68)  (4.36)  (4.32) 
      
SEG -0.0419**  -0.0481**  -0.0190 
 (-2.03)  (-2.33)  (-0.96) 
      
GSALES 0.1707*** 0.0184 0.0182 
 (4.04)  (0.56)  (0.53) 
      
Log(ASSETS) -0.0416*** -0.0312*** -0.0317*** 
 (-7.48)  (-5.48)  (-5.77) 
      
Adjusted R
2  0.05 0.02 0.02 
Observations 1754 1928 2144 
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Table 9:  Random effect regressions of the impact of group affiliation and cash-vote 
divergence on corporate value in East Asia 
 
 
The dependent variable is industry adjusted Tobin's q.  On the right-hand side, GROUP is a dummy variable equal to 
one if a firm is affiliated with a corporate group, and otherwise zero.  SEG is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm 
has more than one segment, and otherwise zero.  C/V is the ratio of cash flow to voting rights possessed by the largest 
ultimate owner of the firm.  GSALES is sales growth.  The full sample includes 5,826 firm-years from nine East Asian 




Independent  variable Pooled Excluding  Japan Pooled Excluding  Japan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Intercept 0.8117*** 1.2751**** 0.8073*** 1.2948*** 
  (12.22) (10.65) (12.21) (10.84) 
      
GROUP -0.0385**  -0.0368  -0.1421*** -0.2450*** 
  (-2.00) (-1.23) (-5.19) (-3.59) 
      
GROUP*C/V     0.1606*** 0.2669*** 
     (5.27)  (3.39) 
      
SEG  -0.0270** -0.0313 -0.0258** -0.0310 
  (-2.17) (-1.32) (-2.07) (-1.31) 
      
GSALES  0.0080 0.0437** 0.0048 0.0435** 
  (0.60) (2.11) (0.36) (2.10) 
      
Log(ASSETS) -0.0489*** -0.0845*** -0.0486*** -0.0860*** 
  (-10.17) (-9.44) (-10.16) (-9.64) 
      
-2 Res Log Likelihood  4029  3223  4007  3215 
Observations  5826 2438 5826 2438 
 
 